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Introduction
Information infrastructures across many public and private domains share several common 
attributes regarding IT deployments and data communications. This is particularly true in the 
control systems domain. A majority of the systems use robust architectures to enhance business 
and reduce costs by increasing the integration of external, business, and control system networks. 
However, multi-network integration strategies often lead to vulnerabilities that greatly reduce the
security of an organization, and can expose mission-critical control systems to cyber threats.
This document provides guidance and direction for developing ‘defense-in-depth’ strategies for 
organizations that use control system networks while maintaining a multi-tier information
architecture that requires:
x Maintenance of various field devices, telemetry collection, and/or industrial-level 
process systems
x Access to facilities via remote data link or modem
x Public facing services for customer or corporate operations
x A robust business environment that requires connections among the control system
domain, the external Internet, and other peer organizations. 
Background
The critical infrastructure systems that support major industries, such as manufacturing, 
transportation, and energy, are highly dependent on information systems for their command and 
control. While there is still a high dependence on legacy control systems, critical 
infrastructure/key resource (CI/KR) systems are migrating to new communication technologies. 
As a result, the diverse and disparate proprietary mechanics of control systems are being 
replaced with common communications protocols and open architecture standards, which can 
have both positive and negative impacts.
On one hand, the migration empowers control system users and manufacturers to offer new and 
more efficient methods of communication, as well as more robust data, quicker time to market,
and interoperability. On the other hand, empowering control system users introduces new risks. 
Cyber-related vulnerabilities and risks are being created that could not exist when the CI/KR 
information infrastructures that involve control systems were isolated. The interdependence of 
CI/KR systems, such as in the power sector, has been illustrated in a number of instances, 
including the 2003 North American blackout. 
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The new protocols and communication standards that are providing increased interoperability
and control in the control system community are the same technologies that have been exploited 
and compromised in the Internet and networking domains. Historically, control system security 
meant locating and identifying problems in a closed-loop system; now unauthorized intrusion or 
attacks are evolving issues to be addressed.
Figure 1 illustrates the traditional separation of corporate architectures and control domains. This 
architecture provided means for data sharing, data acquisition, peer-to-peer data exchange, and 
other business operations. However, the security of any given system was based on the fact that 
few, if any, understood the intricate architecture or the operational mechanics of the resources on 
the controls system LAN. This ‘security by obscurity’ works well for environments that have no 
external communication connections which allow an organization to focus on physical security.
Figure 1 – Traditional isolation of corporate and control domains 
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Overview of Contemporary Control System Architectures 
In today’s competitive markets, isolated control system networks are being inter-connected. In 
connecting these networks, and introducing IT components into the control system domain,
security problems arise due to: 
x Increasing dependency on automation and control systems
x Insecure connectivity to external networks 
x Usage of technologies with known vulnerabilities 
x No business case for cyber security in control system environments
x Control system technologies have limited security, and if they do the vendor-supplied 
security capabilities are generally only enabled if the administrator is aware of the 
capability
x Control system communications protocols are absent of security functionality
x Considerable amount of open source information is available regarding control system
configuration and operations. 
Control system operational security has historically been defined by industry as the level of 
reliability of the system to operate. The total isolation from the external (and untrusted) network 
allowed the organization to reduce the level of communications security—threats to operations 
resided with physical access to a facility or plant floor. Thus, most data communications in the 
information infrastructure required limited authorization or security oversight. Operational 
commands, instructions, and data acquisition occurred in a closed environment where all 
communications were trusted. In general, if a command or instruction was sent via the network it 
was anticipated to arrive and perform the authorized function, as only authorized operators had 
access to the system.
Obviously, this arrangement is very different from effective network and IT cyber security 
systems. Merging a modern IT architecture with an isolated network that may not have any 
effective security countermeasures is challenging. Although simple connectivity using routers 
and switching is the most obvious means to provide interconnectivity, unauthorized access by an 
individual will provide unlimited access to the systems. Figure 2 shows an integrated
architecture.
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Figure 2 – Integrated networks 
From Figure 2, it is clear that such architectures, if compromised, could provide an attacker with 
various avenues for accessing critical systems, either on the corporate LAN, the control LAN, or 
even the communications LAN. In addition, the very nature of such architectures demands the 
exchange of data from disparate information sources, a factor that could clearly be taken 
advantage of by an attacker.
1
1 This type of architecture, and the back end control system, is vulnerable to both external attackers and internal attackers. Insider
attacks have always been a major threat to IT systems, but architectures like that in Figure 2 exacerbate the issue by providing for
access to a large, highly connected, and unprotected trusted information infrastructure. The insider has historically been a threat
to control systems, but new connectivity creates opportunity for the external attacker as well.
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Security Challenges in Control Systems 
Within modern TCP/IP based environments, such as the corporate infrastructure for managing
the business that drives operations in a control system, there are technology-related
vulnerabilities that need to be addressed. Historically, these issues have been the responsibility of 
the corporate IT security organization, usually governed by security policies and operating plans 
that protect vital information assets. Clearly, the main concern as control systems become part of 
these large architectures is providing security procedures that cover the control system domain as 
well. Contemporary network-based communications have security issues that must be addressed 
in the control system domain, as unique vendor-specific protocols and assumed legacy system
security is not adequate to protect mission critical systems.
Examples of threats in open systems architectures that can (and most likely will) migrate to 
control system domains include hostile mobile code (if applicable to the system), escalations of 
privileges through code manipulation, network reconnaissance and data gathering, covert traffic 
analysis, and unauthorized intrusions into networks either through or around perimeter defenses. 
With successful intrusion into control systems networks come new issues, such as reverse 
engineering of control system protocols, attacks on operator consoles, and unauthorized access
into conjoined peer networks and remote facilities. To fully translate information security and 
information assurance into the control system realm, one must understand the key differences 
between traditional IT architectures and control systems technology.
From a mitigation perspective, simply deploying IT security technologies into a control system
may not be a viable solution. Although modern control systems use the same underlying 
protocols that are used in IT and business networks, the very nature of control system
functionality may make even proven security technologies inappropriate. Some sectors, such as 
energy, transportation, and chemical, have time sensitive requirements, so the latency and 
‘throughput’ issues associated with security strategies may introduce unacceptable delays and 
degrade or prevent acceptable system performance.
There are several key differences between traditional IT environments and control system
environments insofar as security is concerned. Table 1 shows some of the more common security 
elements an organization could leverage, and how they are addressed in IT domains, as opposed 
to architectures that run control systems.
2
2 NIST SP 800-82 will have a concise section discussing these differences.
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SECURITY TOPIC 
INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY
CONTROL SYSTEMS
Anti-virus/Mobile Code 
Common
Widely used 
Uncommon/Impossible to 
deploy effectively 
Support Technology
Lifetime
2-3 Years 
Diversified vendors
Up to 20 years
Single vendor 
Outsourcing
Common
Widely Used 
Operations are often 
outsourced, but not
diverse to various 
providers
Application of Patches
Regular
Scheduled
Rare, Unscheduled
Vendor specific
Change Management 
Regular
Scheduled
Highly managed and 
complex
Time Critical Content Generally delays accepted Delays are unacceptable 
Availability Generally delays accepted 24x7x365 (continuous)
Security Awareness
Moderate in both private 
and public sector 
Poor except for physical
Security Testing/Audit
Part of a good security 
program
Occasional testing for 
outages
Physical Security
Secure (server rooms, 
etc.)
Remote/Unmanned
Secure
Table 1 – Security focus in IT vs. Control Systems 
Security Profiles and Attack Methodologies 
Control networks have evolved from stand-alone islands to interconnected networks that co-exist 
with corporate IT environments, introducing security threats. For example, mobile code, in the 
form of viruses, worms, and parasitic code can manifest itself in network-enabled control system
environments just as easily as in non-control system domains. For devices with embedded
firmware, such as controllers and relays, hostile mobile code cannot generally have an impact
through network propagation. However, should the compiled code these devices download on a 
regular basis be corrupted with hostile malware, the effects could be very damaging.
3
3 Although the occurrence of this type of compromise is currently unlikely, such attack vectors should not be ignored when
considering future attack scenarios.
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Critical cyber security issues that need to be addressed include those related to:
x Backdoors and holes in network perimeter
x Vulnerabilities in common protocols
x Attacks on Field Devices
x Database Attacks 
x Communications hijacking and ‘Man-in-the-middle’ attacks 
Understanding attack vectors is essential to building effective security mitigation strategies. The 
level of knowledge in the control system community regarding these vectors may need to 
increase in order to mitigate these vulnerabilities. Effective security depends on how well the 
community of control system operators and vendors understand the ways that architectures can 
be compromised.
4
Several in-depth technical discussions are provided by DHS in the Control Systems Security 
program via the DHS Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT). For this 
recommendations document, a discussion of various attack vectors may provide some insight 
into how a defense-in-depth strategy can be effective: 
Backdoor Attacks via Network Perimeter5
As in common networking environments, control system domains are subject to myriad
vulnerabilities and holes that can provide an attacker a ‘backdoor’ to gain unauthorized access. 
Often, backdoors are simple shortcomings in the architecture perimeter, or embedded capabilities 
that are forgotten, unnoticed, or simply disregarded. Adversaries (threats) often do not require 
physical access to a domain to gain access to it, and will use any and all discovered access 
functionality. Modern networks and especially those in the control system arena, often have
inherent capabilities that are deployed without sufficient security analysis, and can provide 
access to attackers once they are discovered. These ‘backdoors’ can be accidentally created in 
various places on the network, but it is the network perimeter that is of greatest concern. 
When looking at network perimeter components, the modern architecture will have technologies 
to provide for robust access. These technologies often include firewalls, public-facing services, 
and wireless access. Each of these will allow enhanced communications in and amongst
affiliated networks, and will often be a sub-system of a much larger and more complex
information infrastructure. However, each of these components can (and often does) have
associated security vulnerabilities that an attacker will try to detect and leverage.
Unsecured wireless access is a reoccurring element in many organizations, and such 
deployments are common due to the ease-of-use of wireless communications as well as a low 
level of understanding regarding security implications of wireless deployments. Moreover, in the 
4 The technical mechanics of attacks are beyond the scope of this paper.
5 http://www.us-cert.gov/control_systems/pdf/backdoors_holes0805.pdf
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plant floor environment, wireless technology is easier to deploy than traditional wired 
infrastructures, which can require drilling through walls and laying cable.
Common security issues with wireless communications often include the residual effects of 
default installations. Attackers, once having discovered wireless communications points, can 
leverage the inherent functionality of wireless networks to their advantage, and take advantage of 
service set identifier (SSID) broadcasting, limited access controls, lack of encryption, and limited
network segmentation.
Although much of the complexity in maintaining secure systems can be avoided by proper patch-
management programs, there is a major problem for control system units when both geography 
and accessibility are a concern. Remotely located control system elements that can be accessed 
via remotely connected communications require special consideration. Often, if systems are 
based on commercial operating systems, the attacks can be via denial of service, escalated 
privilege exploits, or clandestine tools such as a Trojan horse or logic bomb.
With remote connectivity being commonplace, the security perimeter facilitating access to the 
control system has been moved back out to the corporate level or even the remote operator level. 
Clearly, compromising a computing resource that has access to a control system is the same as 
compromising the control system itself. This concern relates to the interception, modification,
and re-injection of control data into a network, or the possibility of an attacker escalating
privileges within the control domain to execute engineering level instructions across the control 
signal communications loop.
When considering the historical characteristics of controls system networks, especially those that
impact security due to the presence of plaintext traffic and inherent trust relationships, 
unauthorized access via a wireless access point into the control domain provide an attacker with 
a very effective backdoor, often bypassing security perimeters.
To allow robust information transfer, organizations in many CI/KR sectors provide data to 
customers, providers, and affiliates through publicly accessible services. These services are 
critical to business operations in many sectors, such as electrical and water, as they provide data 
for calculating load expectations, billing futures, and associated operational information. As 
these services are in the public domain, they are often accessible from the Internet with little or 
no user access limitations. The data on these servers is usually sourced from the business domain
(after it is collected from the control domain) as well as collected from the public domain.
This interconnected capability, as effective as it is, is also a vector for attackers to gain access 
into the protected business networks and perhaps the control systems networks. Attackers can 
often collect important information from these public servers, including data regarding 
operations, customers, and file transfers. Moreover, if the servers are compromised, the attackers 
can escalate their privileges and leverage the communication channel to the back-end business 
networks or even the control networks.
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Networks with firewalls to separate pubic servers from internal networks often find it hard to 
defend against these types of attacks. To allow robust information to be provided via external 
services, such as a web or ftp server, communication must be made from the web server to the 
internal databases or historians, and this is connection is made via the firewall. If deployed 
without effective security countermeasures, the trust relationship between the firewall and the 
web server allows data to flow from the external side to the internal domain. If this data is 
unauthorized, and is the product of an attack that has compromised the trusted web server, the 
attacker has a channel to access internal services on the business (or control systems) LAN. 
In general, there is a delicate balance between business functionality and security. This balance 
has to be evaluated properly and revisited often. The deployment of modern technology to 
increase productivity and access requires special attention so prevent backdoors into the business 
or control system networks. 
Attacks Using Common Protocols, i.e. OPC/DCOM attacks6
The impact of modern operating systems on control systems has been significant. Over the last
several years, more and more organizations have started to use underlying services in these 
environments, some of them being the Object Link and Embedding (OLE), Distributed 
Component Object Model (DCOM), and Remote Procedure Call (RPC). OLE for Process 
Control (OPC) is a real-time data communications standard based in these services. Although 
many installations are moving away from the Microsoft-based OPC model, OPC is commonly
used for efficient connectivity with diverse control systems equipment.
Historically, the data access standards provided by OLE, COM, and DCOM are found 
extensively in common computing platforms, and continue to be a significant target for attackers.
The convergence of traditionally isolated control networks with business environments provides 
a new environment for attackers to exploit. What makes this very interesting, and also a concern, 
is that the traditional mitigation strategies for common networks are not always effective or
practical in control systems architectures. 
Applying security patches to operating systems and applications that run control systems is not a 
trivial endeavor. Prior to modification, rigorous testing must be completed to ensure that
modifications do not impact operations. This, in itself, makes application of security patches, and 
thus the mitigation of security vulnerabilities, a challenge. In a simple example, SP2 for 
Microsoft XP, a platform commonly used in control systems, mitigates the security issues 
associated with some mobile code attacks by disabling DCOM. If this patch is deployed in a 
production environment where OPC is used for interoperability, OPC over DCOM will not work. 
There have been several reports of this patch bringing production facilities to a complete stop, or 
creating unexpected and irrational behavior in the control systems.
6 See US-CERT “Security Implications of OPC, OLE, DCOM, and RPC in Control Systems.”
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With the convergence of control systems and modern networking technologies comes some
inherited security vulnerabilities. Even though many of these vulnerabilities have solutions and 
available workarounds, the deployment of these mitigations in control systems architectures is 
not always feasible. 
Attack into control system via field devices
Control systems architectures usually have a capability for remote access to terminal end points 
and telemetry devices. In some cases, the field equipment itself has the capability to be accessed
a number of ways, including by telephonic or dedicated means. To provide for the collection of 
operational and maintenance data, some modern equipment has embedded file servers and web 
servers to facilitate robust communications. Engineers and administrators often have a secondary 
means of communicating with these field devices using this access capability in addition to other
dedicated communications channels.
However, as has been previously discussed, these devices are part of an internal and trusted 
domain, and thus access into these devices can provide an attacker with an unauthorized vector 
into the control system architecture. By gaining access into a field device, the attacker can 
become part of the sensor network and ‘tunnel’ back into the control system network. 
Recognizing that field devices, such as RTUs, are an extension of the control domain, attackers 
can add these field devices to their list of viable targets to be investigated during reconnaissance 
and scanning phases of the attack. Although such attacks are typically not possible across serial 
connections, the security related to the convergence of modern networking protocols and 
traditional control protocols in remote devises requires attention. 
If a device is compromised, and the attacker can leverage control over the device and escalate 
privileges, the attacker can begin to execute a number of procedures, including scanning back 
into the internal control network, altering the data that will be sent to the control master, or 
changing the behavior of the device itself. If the attacker decides to scan back into the control
network, which is probable considering the assumed trust between resources, it may be possible 
to do so by using the communications protocols for the entire control system domain. This is of 
particular advantage to the attacker, as it is likely that the connections are not monitored for 
malicious or suspect traffic.
7
Database and SQL data injection attacks8
Database applications have become core application components of control systems and their 
associated record keeping utilities. Traditional security models attempt to secure systems by 
isolating core control system components and concentrating security efforts against threats
7 Some Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) can be updated with control systems signatures to help defend control domains.
Usually, these systems are signature-based and will trigger on seeing recognized malicious traffic. In lieu of viable signature, IDS
can be deployed to trigger on non-specific traffic, or upon seeing traffic that is not expected or unusual. See below for the 
discussion on IDS.
8 See US-CERT “Attack Methodology Analysis: SQL Injection Attacks.” 
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specific to those computers or software components. Database security within control systems
follows these models by using generally independent systems that rely on one another for proper 
functionality. The high level of reliance between the two systems creates an expanded threat 
surface.
Databases used by control systems are often connected to databases or computers with web-
enabled applications located on the business network. Virtually every data-driven application has 
transitioned to some form of database, and most use Structured Query Language (SQL). 
The information contained in databases makes them high-value targets for any attacker. When
control system databases are connected to business or financial databases or to computers with 
applications used to access the data, attackers can exploit the communications channel between 
the two networks and bypass the security mechanisms used to protect the control system
environment.
Figure 3 – Attacking via databases 
Figure 3 shows an example of the open connectivity between databases. This example illustrates
a communication path between the servers that an attacker would be able to leverage to gain 
access to the control network. Injection into a database with valuable data can have far-reaching 
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effects, especially in a control system environment where data accuracy and integrity are critical 
for both business and operational decision-making. The cascading effect of corrupted database 
content can impact data acquisition servers, historians, and even the operator HMI console. 
Control systems are more adversely affected by SQL injection than are many general IT 
databases because they are so reliant on data accuracy and integrity. Moreover, compromise of 
key trusted assets, such as a database, creates additional resources the attacker can use for both 
reconnaissance and code execution. 
Given the reliance of control systems on the storage, accuracy, and accessibility of command and 
control data, as well as the prevalence of SQL databases on these types of networks, standard 
SQL injection techniques against control system components pose a major threat to control 
system security. 
Man-in-the-middle attacks9
Control system environments have traditionally been (or been intended to be) protected from
non-authorized persons by air gapping. In these networks, data that flows between servers, 
resources, and devices is often less secured. Three of the key security issues that arise from
assumed trust are (1) the ability for an attacker to re-route data that is in transit on a network, (2) 
the ability to capture and analyze critical traffic that is in plaintext format, and (3) the ability to 
reverse engineer any unique protocols to gain command over control communications. By 
combining all of these, an attacker can assume exceptionally high control over the data flowing 
in a network, and ultimately direct both real and ‘spoofed’ traffic to network resources in support 
of the desired outcome. To do this, a ‘man-in-the-middle’, or MITM, attack is executed. 
Management of addresses in a network, be it a control system or a business LAN, is critical to 
effective operations. Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) helps maintain routing by helping map
network addresses to physical machine addresses. Using ARP tables in each of the network 
devices ensures that computers and other devices know how to route their traffic when 
requesting communication. Thus manipulation (or poisoning) of the ARP tables is a key goal of 
the attacker, as poisoning the ARP tables can force all network traffic (including control traffic) 
to be routed through the computer the attacker has compromised. In this manner, all resources on 
the network will have to talk to the attacker without knowing they are not communicating with 
the desired host. Moreover, the attacker can see, capture, replay, and inject data into the network 
and have it interpreted as if it were authorized and coming from a valid source. 
Data analysis is a significant problem in the control system realm. For control system
installations that are governed by common (open) network protocol and technologies, the threat 
of data analysis while the data is in transit is a major concern. The data that often traverses
today’s local control environment is in plaintext. Historically, this vulnerability has allowed
attackers to observe and re-use username/password combinations to increase access within a 
compromised network.
9 http://www.us-cert.gov/control_systems/pdf/csvul1105.pdf
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Assuming an attacker has gained access onto the controls systems network, perhaps using any of 
the aforementioned attacks, he will use network reconnaissance to determine resources that are 
available on that network. As the attack is on the control domain, this plaintext traffic can be 
harvested (sniffed) and taken offline for analysis and review. This allows the attacker to review
and re-engineer packet and payload content, modify the instruction set to accommodate the goal 
of the attack, and re-inject the new (and perhaps malicious) packet into the network. Control 
traffic, regardless of its unique nature, is not complex insofar as the nomenclature used for 
instruction in data payloads, and the data contained in the packets is used to control the action of 
the field devices and to provide input as to what is seen by the operator at the Human Machine
Interface (HMI) station.
Using ARP poisoning and collecting traffic, the attacker can establish and maintain complete
control over the communications in the network. If the attacker needs to acquire and analyze 
unique control system protocols, control data can be seen, captured, and manipulated. The time
to reverse engineer key control data, and manipulate that data for nefarious purposes, is now 
available to the attacker.
In any environment, this MITM attack is exceptionally dangerous. However, in the control
systems networks this mode of attack becomes even more critical. By assuming control of a key 
information resource, and performing a MITM attack, the attacker can continue to attack the 
system by: 
x Stopping operations 
x Capturing, modifying, and replaying control data 
x Injecting inaccurate data to falsify information in key databases, timing clocks, and 
historians
x Replaying normal operational data to the operator HMI while executing a malicious
attack on the field device (while preventing the HMI from issuing alarms).
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Isolating and Protecting Assets: Defense-in-Depth Strategies
Modern IT architectures that involve both business and control network components share many
common characteristics, regardless of how diversified their applications may be. In general, there 
are four main domains (zones) that provide: 
x External connectivity to the Internet, peer locations, and back-up facilities (Zone 1) 
x External connectivity for corporate communications (Zone 2) 
x Control systems communications from external services (Zone 3) 
x Control systems operations, be they process based or SCADA (Zone 4). 
Figure 4 illustrates a common modern architecture that contains all of these zones. 
Figure 4 – Common architecture zones 
Each of these zones requires a unique security focus. A ‘peel-the-onion’ analysis shows that an 
attacker trying to affect a critical infrastructure system would most likely be after the core 
control domain.
10
. Manipulation of the control systems information resources can be devastating
if this critical zone is compromised. In many sectors the malicious attack on the control system
will have real-world, physical results.
10 This of course depends on the overall objective of the attacker. In general it is believed that complete control over core services
and operational capability of the control system has high value.
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In this document, and in the suggested supporting documentation provided by DHS through US-
CERT, numerous categories of attacks and outcomes have been discussed. In each of those 
scenarios, the intrusion begins at some point outside the control zone and the attacker pries 
deeper and deeper into the architecture.
Thus, defensive strategies that secure each of the core zones can create a defensive strategy with 
depth, offering the administrators more opportunities for information and resources control, as 
well as introducing cascading countermeasures that will not necessarily impede business
functionality.
Firewalls
Firewalls provide additional levels of defense that support the traditional routers, providing the 
capability to add much tighter and more complex rules for communication between the different
network segments or zones. Of critical importance to control systems is how the firewall is 
implemented and, to a certain degree, how the core functionality of the firewall impacts the 
overall business functionality of the environment.
There are many types of firewalls, and some research is required to ascertain what type of 
firewall is right for a given control architecture. The concept of security zones, as discussed 
earlier, provides some insight as to how an organization can determine what risk and 
consequence is associated with a particular zone. This analysis can be used to select the type of 
firewall and attributes that are best suited for protecting the assets. In general, there are four main
types of firewalls: packet filter, circuit level gateways, proxy gateways, and stateful inspection. 
Packet filter firewalls – These firewalls analyze the packets going into and out of separated 
networks, and either permit or deny passage based on a pre-established set of rules. Packet
filtering rules are based on port numbers, protocols, and other defined data that correlates to the 
type of data request being made. Although usually flexible in assigning rules, this type of 
firewall is well suited for environments where quick connections are required and rules can be 
developed based on device addresses. It is effective for environments, such as control systems,
that need security based on unique applications and protocols.
Proxy Gateway Firewalls – These firewalls are critical in hiding the networks they are 
protecting, and are used as primary gateways to proxy the connection initiated by a protected 
resource. Often called Application-level gateways, they are similar to circuit-level gateways 
except that they address the application. They filter at the Application Layer of the OSI model,
and do not allow any connections for which there is no proxy available. These firewalls are good 
for analyzing data inside the application (POST, GET, etc.), as well as collecting data about user 
activities (logon, admin, etc.). They are gateways and require users to direct their connection to 
the firewall. They also have some impact on network performance due to the nature of the 
analysis. In control systems environments, this type of firewall is well suited to separating the 
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business and control LANs, as well as providing protection to a demilitarized zone (DMZ) and 
other assets that require application-specific defenses. 
Stateful Inspection Firewalls – These firewalls include characteristics of all the other types of
firewalls. They filter at the network layer, determine the legitimacy of the sessions, and evaluate
contents of the packets at the application layer. They tend to use algorithms to process data rather 
than run proxies. These firewalls execute a considerable amount of inspection of packets that are 
arriving on the interfaces. These firewalls look at the ‘state’ of the packets and analyze against 
pre-observed activities, thus allowing for a higher level of trust when deciding what is allowed 
and what is not. These firewalls are capable of keeping track of valid sessions, and make a good 
choice for protecting key assets in the control domain. Because many of the vulnerabilities in 
control systems have their roots in trust shared amongst servers and devices, being able to track 
and react to valid and invalid sessions is advantageous`
Figure 5 illustrates the deployment of layered firewalls in a multi-zone architecture.
Figure 5 – Firewalls protecting architecture zones
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To help understand how firewalls can be deployed to provide robust network separation, Figure 
6 shows an example of firewall deployment in the energy management domain. In this case, the 
firewall isolates from the corporate domain and protects the Energy Management System (EMS) 
technologies found in the controls center. To provide defense-in-depth, an additional firewall has 
been deployed to separate the EMS domain from the SCADA system.
Figure 6 – Firewall deployment in an energy management network 
Well-configured firewalls are critical to control system security. Communications should be 
restricted to that necessary for system functionality. Control system traffic should be monitored, 
and rules should be developed that allow only necessary access. Any exceptions created in the 
firewall rule set should be as specific as possible, including host, protocol, and port information.
A common oversight is not restricting outbound traffic. Firewall rules should consider both 
directions through the firewall. Most administrators effectively block traffic into the control 
network, but do not filter traffic out of the network. Outbound traffic rules should also be 
created, and such rules should initially have no exceptions. These rules should be fine-tuned so a 
rule set that excludes all unnecessary traffic is created. Once the necessary outbound traffic has 
been determined, a safer configuration can then be created that blocks all traffic with exceptions
for necessary communication.
Traditionally, the role of the firewall in defending networks is straightforward. Like attacks on 
business networks, an attacker targeting a control system needs to obtain information from and 
send files and commands to the control system network. To remotely control any exploit code 
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running on a control system computer, a return connection must be established from the control 
network. With regards to attacking resources in the control system domain, exploit code must be 
small and contain just enough code to get an attacker onto the target computer, as there is 
generally not enough space to add logic onto the device for the attacker to get advanced 
functionality. Therefore, additional instructions are needed from the attacker to continue with the 
discovery portion of the attack. If outbound filtering is implemented correctly, the attacker will 
not receive this return connection and cannot discover and control the exploited machine.
11
Creating Demilitarized Zones (DMZs)
Network segmentation has traditionally been accomplished by using multiple routers. Firewalls 
should be used to create DMZs to protect the control network. Multiple DMZs could also be 
created for separate functionalities and access privileges, such as peer connections, the data 
historian, the Inter Control Center Communications Protocol (ICCP) server in SCADA systems,
the security servers, replicated servers, and development servers. Figure 7 shows a robust 
architecture with multiple DMZ deployments.
Figure 7 – Architecture with DMZ deployments
11 www.niscc.gov.uk/niscc/docs/re-20050223-00157.pdf
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All connections to the Control System LAN should be routed through the firewall, with no 
connections circumventing it. Network administrators need to keep an accurate network diagram
of their control system LAN and its connections to other protected subnets, DMZs, the corporate 
network, and the outside. 
Multiple DMZs have proved to be very effective in protecting large architectures comprised of
networks with different operational mandates. A perfect example, illustrated in Figure 7, is the
conjoined networks for control systems and business. In this example, the secure flow of data 
into and out of the different environments is critical to operations. Having multiple DMZs
protects the information resources from attacks using Virtual-LAN (VLAN) hopping and trust 
exploitation, and is a very good way to enhance the security posture and add another layer to the 
defense-in-depth strategy. 
Intrusion Detection Systems
When considering the most logical route an attacker will take in compromising a control 
network, it is easy to visualize an attack path that pries deeper and deeper into the architecture.
Starting from the external environment, an attacker will move past perimeter devices and 
ultimately strive for access to both the network and hosts on that network. Bear in mind that this 
access may be via field devices where remote access requirements can introduce vulnerabilities
into control system architectures.  Once on the target network, the attacker must begin to collect 
intelligence through reconnaissance, followed by attempts at compromising more and more 
components. In each of these cases, unusual and unauthorized activity would be present in the 
network, and this activity can be monitored (and acted upon) to provide another level of defense. 
There are several common methods for monitoring a network for unusual or unauthorized 
activity, with one of the most effective being Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). It is important 
to keep in mind that intrusion detection is not a single product or technology. It is a 
comprehensive set of tools providing network monitoring that can give an administrator a 
complete picture of how the network is being used. Implementing a variety of these tools helps 
to create a defense-in-depth architecture that can be more effective in identifying attacker
activities.
An intrusion detection system, by its very nature, is passive. In a network deployment, the 
function of the IDS is to watch and assess the traffic or network activity without impacting that 
traffic. Having collected data, IDS compares it against a pre-defined rule set, as well as against a 
set of known attack ‘signatures’. The IDS will investigate port numbers and data payload to 
determine if any nefarious activity is occurring. Having recognized an attack pattern, or any 
deviation from what has been defined as normal/allowable traffic, the systems will carry out a set 
of instructions that can include alerting a systems administrator. Extensive logging is also a 
function of most IDSs available today. 
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Most IDS are signature based. In modern business environments, this is very acceptable, as there 
is an abundance of signatures for many network and host architectures using modern protocols 
and modern operating platforms. Security vulnerabilities in the contemporary business domain
are also common, so it is often easy to fine-tune IDS for networks and hosts using ubiquitous 
technologies. Like the issues surrounding the deployment of patches and other security 
technologies in controls systems, the configuration and deployment of IDS is not 
straightforward. For example, even though many contemporary IDS signatures files are very 
robust and can detect a wide range of attacks, the signatures required to monitor for malicious
traffic in control networks are not adequate. When looking at the unique communications
protocols used in control systems, such as Modbus or DNP3, specific payload and port numbers
have traditionally not been a part of the signatures seen in contemporary IDS. In short, modern
IDS deployed on a control systems network may be blind to the types of attacks that a control
system would experience. 
When deploying IDS in a control system, the ability to add unique signatures must be used. It is 
also commonplace to remove some of the default signatures and response capability, as it may
have no relevance to a control system network. However, analysis must be made to ensure some
of the inherent capability of the IDS is leveraged, with some of the capability refined and 
augmented. Many security vendors, including those specializing in control systems security, 
have created signatures for the IDS that are deployed in control architectures. It is imperative, 
when deploying IDS on control system networks, that rules sets and signatures unique to that 
domain be used. It has been shown that developing security signatures and rules in a cooperative 
relationship with the control system vendor is very advantageous.
One of the common problems observed in industry is that tools deployed for network monitoring
are implemented but improperly updated, monitored, or validated. Assigned individuals should 
be trained and given the responsibility of monitoring system data logs and keeping the various 
tool configurations current. 
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Complete defense-in-depth strategy with IDS 
Deploying IDS at the host level is similar to deploying it at the network level, but rather than 
monitoring network activity, the IDS monitors with respect to rule sets. These rules can be very 
robust and extensive, and can include alerting on pre-defined signatures that are unique to the 
platform or operating systems the host is running. IDS placement at the host level provides yet 
another level of defense-in-depth, and can be used to augment the defense strategies deployed at 
the perimeter and network levels. 
It is important to realize that due to the passive nature of IDS, security mitigation and attack
realization is a function of how often (and how effective) the analysis of log files is done. Robust 
policies directing the timely analysis of IDS log is very important. If an attacker is able to gain 
access to a system and execute an attack prior to the log files being reviewed, IDS and the ability 
to counter an attack becomes a moot point.
The Security Policy
Effective security policies and procedures are the first step to a secure control systems network. 
Many of the same policies used for Information Technology (IT) security for corporate systems
can be applied directly to control system networks. The SANS Institute provides free templates
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for many types of security policies, and can be a valuable resource for control system network 
administrators in developing their own policies. Control system-specific requirements can then 
be added to it, such as the North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) cyber security 
requirements for electric systems.
12
To make the security policy effective, it must be practical and enforceable, and it must be 
possible to comply with the policy. The policy must not significantly impact productivity, be cost 
prohibitive, or lack support. This is best accomplished by including both management and 
system administrator personnel in policy development.
Network and control system administrators have technical knowledge, but they also need 
authorization and support from management to implement the policy. Management must support 
the appointment and development of appropriate personnel resources to implement and 
administer control system security. 
Security Training
In many cases, the individuals administering a control system network may not have adequate 
security training. This situation is generally due to a lack of funding or appreciation for the 
importance of this training. Training is a core component of an overarching security awareness 
program, and is comprised of several key attributes used to support the protection of key 
information and information resources. 
Security training and robust security awareness programs that are specific to the controls systems
domain are critical to the security of the control systems, as well as the safety of those involved 
with any automated processes. Like the security awareness programs that are developed for the 
corporate domains, the programs that will support control systems domains have key 
components that can help drive a continuous and measurable security posture. Within common 
security awareness programs, such as those listed in NIST SP800-50 ‘Building an Information 
Technology Security Awareness and Training Program’ 13, organizations can create applicable 
security awareness and training curricula that can include: 
x Purpose and Scope 
x Materials Development
x Implementation Strategies 
x Monitoring and Feedback 
x Success Measurement
Network security administrators require continuous training to keep up to date with the fast-
paced changes and advances in the network security field. This includes the latest network 
architecture designs, firewall and IDS configurations. New techniques are constantly being 
12 http://www.nerc.com/~filez/standards/Cyber_Sec_Renewal.html
13 http://www.csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-50/NIST-SP800-50.pdf
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developed to attack, and to defend, computer networks. It is very important to have 
comprehensive computer security training, not only for system administrators, but also for each 
user.
If formal training is cost prohibitive, some of this information can be gleaned from books, 
papers, and web sites on cyber and control systems security. As an example, and as a resource to 
help build content for a control systems specific training curriculum, US-CERT maintains a 
website dedicated to control systems cyber security, at http://www.us-cert.gov/control_systems/
Incident Response
To fully support a defense-in-depth strategy, a robust incident response capability is required. In 
the event there is a security-related incident in the controls system domain, activities to
recognize, respond, mitigate, and resume need to be established. An incident response procedure 
will instruct employees on the steps to take if a computer on the network has been compromised.
All employees should be trained on, and have access to, the procedure before an incident occurs. 
Examples of questions to be answered in the incident response procedure include: 
x What are the indications that an incident has occurred or is currently in progress?
x What immediate actions should be taken (e.g., should the computer be unplugged from the 
network)?
x Who should be notified, and in what order? Should law enforcement be consulted? 
x How should forensic evidence be preserved (e.g., should the computer be left on to preserve 
the evidence in memory)?
x How can the affected computers be restored?
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) developed a Computer Security 
Incident Handling Guide, SP 800-53, which provides guidance to security personnel in 
developing an incident response procedure. In addition, US-CERT has extensive information and 
reporting capabilities available for any control system security incident. This reporting can be 
done at http://www.us-cert.gov/control_systems/.
Specific Recommendations and Countermeasures 
When protecting any information infrastructure, good security starts with a proactive security 
model. This iterative model is comprised of several key security strategies that are illustrated in 
Figure 8. 
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Figure 8 – Proactive security model
Traditionally, development of a defense-in-depth strategy starts with mapping the control
systems architecture. Having an accurate and well-documented architecture can enable an 
organization to be very security-conscious, deploy effective security countermeasures, and be 
equipped to understand security incidents more readily. Having an understanding of the 
architecture will allow the administrators to know what it is they want to protect. A robust
understanding of architecture also allows for effective risk assessments, as the development of 
the assessment parameters and processes can be easily aligned to the existing (and known) 
information assets in the control system environment. 
Having been able to execute a security assessment, the organization can now assign asset ID’s 
within the control domain, leading to definition of the overall profile of the command and control 
environment. Following the development of the profile, the defense-in-depth strategy can be 
deployed, as much of the final phases of the mitigation strategy involves the deployment of 
technology that is supported by recursive and on-going security training. 
5 Key Security Countermeasures for Control Systems
Here are 5 key countermeasures that can be used to drive cyber-security activities in control 
systems environments.
1. Security policies. Security policies should be developed for the control system network 
and its individual components, but they should be reviewed periodically to incorporate 
the current threat environment, system functionality, and required level of security 
2. Blocking access to resources and services. This technique is generally employed on the 
network through the use of perimeter devices with access control lists, such as firewalls 
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or proxy servers. It can be enabled on the host via host-based firewalls and anti-virus 
software.
3. Detecting malicious activity. Detection activities of malicious activity can be network or 
host based and usually requires regular monitoring of log files by experienced 
administrators. Intrusion detection systems are the common means of identifying 
problems on a network, but they can be deployed on individual hosts as well. Auditing 
and event logs should be enabled on individual hosts when possible.
4. Mitigating possible attacks. In many cases, a vulnerability may have to be present due to 
the fact that removal of the vulnerability may result in an inoperable or inefficient
system. Mitigation allows administrators to control access to vulnerability in such a 
fashion that the vulnerability cannot be exploited. Enabling technical workarounds, 
establishing filters, or running services and applications with specific configurations can
often do this.
5. Fixing core problems. The resolution of core security problems almost always requires 
updating, upgrading, or patching the software vulnerability or removing the vulnerable 
application. The software hole can reside in any of the three layers (networking, 
operating system, or application). When available, the mitigation should be provided by 
the vendor or developer for administrators to apply.
Suggested Reading 
x INL Risk Doc (when available)
x INL SQL doc (when available) 
x INL OPC/DCOM doc (when available) 
x Control Systems Cyber Security Awareness
x An Undirected Attack Against Critical Infrastructure: A Case Study for Improving
your Control System Security
x Backdoors and Holes in Network Perimeters: A Case Study for Improving your
Control System Security
x Common Control System Vulnerability
x A Comparison of Electrical Sector Cyber Security Standards and Guidelines
October 2004
x Intruder Detection Checklist
x Personnel Security Guidelines
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x A Comparison of Oil and Gas Segment Cyber Security Standards
Glossary
ASN – Abstract Syntax Notation
CC – Common Criteria
CERT – Computer Emergency Response Team
COE – Common Operating Environment
COM – Common Object Model 
DCE – Data Communications Equipment
DCOM – Distributed Common Object Model
DCS – Distributed Control System
DHS NCSD – DHS National Cyber Security Division
DOS – Denial of Service
DNP – Distributed Network Protocol
DOI – Domain of Interest
DTE – Data Terminal Equipment
EOP – Emergency Operating Procedures
EPA – Enhanced Performance Architecture
ES-ISAC – Energy Sector ISAC 
FIPS – Federal Information Processing Standard
FTP – File Transfer Protocol
I&W – Indications and Warning
ICS – Industrial Control System
IEC – International Electrotechnical Commission
IEC TC – International Electrotechnical Commission technical Committee 
IED – Intelligent Electronic Device
IP –Internet Protocol
ISAC – Information Sharing and Analysis Center
ISO – International Standards Organization
NIPC – National Infrastructure Protection Center
NIST – National Institute of Standards and Technology
OEM – Original Equipment Manufacturer
OLE – Object Linking and Embedding
OPC – OLE for Process Control
OSI – Open Systems Interconnectivity
PCS – Process Control System
PLC – Programmable Logic Controller
POTS – Plain Old Telephone Service
PSTN – Packet Switched Telephone Network
RPC – Remote Procedure Call
RTU – Remote Terminal Unit/Remote Telemetry Unit
SCADA – Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
SIRC – Security Incident Response Capability
SMTP – Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
SNMP – Simple Network Message Protocol
SOP – Standard Operating Procedures 
SSID – Service Set Identifier: A code attached to all packets on a wireless network to identify each packet as part of 
that network.
TCP –Transmission Control Protocol
TCSEC – Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (a.k.a Orange Book)
28
Recommended Best Practice: Defense in Depth 
TFTP – Trivial File Transfer Protocol
UDP – User Datagram Protocol
WARDIALING – Recursive dialing of phone numbers from a modem-enabled PC in an attempt to locate other
unadvertised modems resulting in unauthorized access into a computing or PCS domain
WARDRIVING – Recursive searching for wireless access points in an attempt to access a communication network
resulting in unauthorized access into a computing or control system domain
X86 – pronounced ‘ex-eighty six’: The standard abbreviation for the Intel 32-bit processor
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